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Research Highlights 
• This paper compares how relationship value and switching costs influence behavioral 
intentions in B-to-B relationships 
• It argues that the role, i.e. buyer or seller, partly determines how these influences 
unfold. 
• Hypotheses are tested on large scale, cross-sectional survey data using regression 
techniques. 
• It can be shown that relationship value is more important for most behavioral 
intentions than switching costs 
• Also, significant role differences can be uncovered. 
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Abstract 
 
Despite the established importance of buyer-seller relationships in B-to-B markets, 
research to determine the differential effects that keep suppliers and customers in a 
relationship has been scarce. Referring to transaction cost analysis, this study investigates 
how switching costs and relationship value as perceived by each side unfold their bonding 
forces in such a relationship. Based on a large scale survey administered in Germany, Korea, 
New Zealand, and Argentina among marketing/sales and purchasing managers the study 
shows that relationship value has a stronger impact on intentions for relationship 
enhancement, search for alternatives and switch intention than switching costs for both buyers 
and sellers. Only with regard to relational tolerance and only for buyers do switching costs 
play a greater role than relationship value. Furthermore, buyers base their future relationship 
intentions more on the current state of the relationship than suppliers. Our results suggest that 
role differences must be taken into account when studying institutional arrangements in B-to-
B markets.  
 
Keywords: buyer-seller relationship, relationship value, switching costs, buyer role, seller 
role, transaction cost analysis, transaction value analysis, behavioral intentions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, research in business-to-business markets has increasingly 
focused on the study of buyer-seller relationships because relationships generate many 
benefits for organizations, e.g. in terms of increased performance, competitiveness, 
satisfaction, and innovation (Gummesson, 2004; Lindgreen & Wynstra, 2005; Ravald & 
Grönroos, 1996; Sharma, Tzokas, Saren, & Kyziridis, 1999). A buyer-seller relationship can 
be defined as a non-accidental sequence of market transactions between independent market 
actors (Kleinaltenkamp & Ehret, 2006). The literature suggests that companies maintain 
relationship bonds either because “they have to”, due to high switching costs, or because 
“they want to”, because of high relationship value (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; Gilliland & 
Bello, 2002; Gounaris, 2005; Liu, 2006; de Ruyter, Moorman, & Lemmink, 2001). So far, 
there is little empirical evidence about the consequences of these two motives on companies’ 
behavioral intentions in relationships. In well-functioning relationships, buyers and sellers not 
only show lower tendencies to search for and switch to alternative partners but are also 
expected to intensify their relationships and even temporarily tolerate disadvantages of being 
in business together (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Bendapudi & Berry, 1997; Gounaris, 2005). 
Because there are many benefits at stake in business relationships, it is central for companies 
to better understand what influences the intentions of their partners. 
One possible aid to understanding lies in the differing roles of business partners. 
However, role differences are largely underexplored in previous research, which is from 
either the buyer’s perspective (e.g. Flint, Woodruff, & Gardial, 2002; Lapierre, 2000; 
Parasuraman, 1997; Ravald & Grönroos, 1996; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006), or the seller’s 
perspective (e.g. Möller & Törrönen, 2003; Simpson, Siguaw, & Baker, 2001; Walter, Ritter, 
& Gemüden, 2001). Other studies have treated both suppliers and customers without 
accounting for their arguably very different role characteristics and perspectives (e.g. 
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Kleinaltenkamp & Ehret, 2006). For example, the value received by a seller relates directly to 
generating a profit (through the sale of products or services), while the value received by a 
buyer has only an indirect effect on its profit by contributing, for instance, to more efficient 
market offerings. These role differences are expected to have serious repercussions on 
behavioral intentions and need to be further explored. This is important for both theory and 
practice since it will contribute to better understanding how to shape and influence the 
development of successful relationships with business partners depending on one’s supply 
chain position. 
Our objective in this paper is hence to investigate the effects of switching costs and 
relationship value on the behavioral intentions of the involved parties in buyer-seller 
relationships by looking specifically at the influence of each actor’s role. This focus 
comprises buyer-seller relationships of different intensity of collaboration (Duffy, 2008), with 
or without a binding formal contract, but excludes other types of business relationships such 
as horizontal strategic alliances. 
The remainder of the paper is structured such that in section 2, we present the 
theoretical framework by reviewing the literature on switching costs, relationship value, and 
role differences. Section 3 contains hypotheses while section 4 details data collection and 
measures. Using regression techniques on buyer and seller data sets, we present results in 
section 5. The last section discusses results, limitations, and managerial implications.  
 
2. Theory and Literature Review 
 
2.1 The emergence of two bonding dimensions in buyer-seller relationships 
 
The literature on industrial marketing seems to agree that companies maintain 
relationships either because they have to or because they want to. The commitment concept 
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helps understand this duality in bonding rationales. Commitment occupies a central role in the 
study of successful relationships between firms (Gilliland & Bello, 2002; Gundlach, Achrol, 
& Mentzer, 1995; Hunt, Arnett, & Madhavaram, 2006; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). While early 
research models commitment as a one-dimensional construct (e.g. Andaleeb, 1996; Anderson 
& Weitz, 1992; Ganesan, 1994), later studies often highlight its duality. Bendapudi and Berry 
(1997) approach this dichotomy as “dedication-based” versus “constraint-based” relationship 
maintenance. In other studies, “affective commitment” is the extent to which partners like to 
stay in existing relationships while “calculative commitment” is the degree to which they need 
to stay (Geyskens, Steenkamp, Scheer, & Kumar, 1996; de Ruyter, et al., 2001). Brown, 
Lusch and Nicholson (1995) used “normative” and “instrumental” commitment for very 
similar notions of bonding between firms. Söllner (1999) bases his arguments on transaction 
cost analysis (TCA) and becomes somewhat more specific about the bonding dimensions in 
buyer-seller relationships: on the one hand, instrumental and attitudinal inputs by one partner 
are specific economic or social-psychological investments1 that would be lost outside the 
focal relationship and hence act as switching costs. In order not to incur those switching costs 
the partner stays in the relationship. On the other hand, relationship outputs (performance, 
justice) represent another bonding dimension which makes business partners want to stay in a 
relationship. More recently, this voluntary dimension is investigated as relationship value 
(Corsaro & Snehota, 2010; Ulaga, 2003; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006). 
 
2.2 Switching Costs as a Bonding Dimension 
 
                                                            
1 A vast body of literature deals with social psychological aspects such as satisfaction, trust or personal bonds on 
the person-to-person or person-to-company level of buyer-seller relationships. We acknowledge the importance 
of those constructs in understanding many aspects of buyer-seller relationships. In this study, however, we deem 
economic theory best suited for our focus on role differences and therefore do not include social-psychological 
aspects. 
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Switching costs as relationship bonding dimensions can be explained by TCA 
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). In TCA, economic actors choose institutional arrangements, e.g. 
markets, organizations, or relational exchanges, which minimize their transaction costs. These 
costs depend on environmental and behavioral uncertainty and on the degree of asset 
specificity. Environmental and behavioral uncertainty arise from economic actors’ bounded 
rationality and opportunism, TCA’s two main assumptions (Williamson, 1985). In long-term 
economic exchange, environmental uncertainty can lead to adaptation problems while 
behavioral uncertainty leads to performance evaluation problems (Rindfleisch & Heide, 
1997). Asset specificity is “the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses 
and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value” (Williamson, 1991, p.281), 
and leads to a safeguarding problem. In TCA, medium levels of the aforementioned problems 
are best governed by relational exchange, e.g. buyer-seller relationships, but are the basis for 
switching costs in such relationships. 
In buyer-seller relationships some assets possess value in only this focal relationship 
and thus require relationship-specific investments. These can be consciously-made specific 
investments into physical or site-specific assets (Handfield & Bechtel, 2002; Haugland, 1999; 
Heide, 1994) or can be unconsciously developed relationship-specific assets like workforce 
skills (Söllner, 1999) or trust in the partner. Dissolution of the current relationship necessitates 
actors investing in new relationship-specific assets in new relationships. These investments 
together with relationship termination costs and search costs for new partners represent an 
economic actor’s switching costs (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997). They tend to force partners to 
stay within buyer-seller relationships as the “have to” bonding mechanism.  
 
2.3 Relationship Value as a Bonding Dimension 
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While many authors criticize TCA for failing to recognize that value creation rather 
than minimizing costs is the primary goal of business exchange (e.g. Anderson, 1995; Ghosh 
& John, 1999; Madhok & Tallman, 1998; Zajac & Olsen, 1993), others see TCA as a starting 
point for analyzing value creation between exchange partners. Kleinaltenkamp and Ehret 
(2006) position specific investments as a source of switching costs but also as an important 
source of value creation. Indeed, productivity advantages of specific investments become 
apparent when the original TCA assumption “output is held constant” (Williamson, 1985, 
p.85) is given up (Kim, 1999; Kleinaltenkamp & Ehret, 2006). Since specific investments are 
particular to the focal relationship, the associated gain referred to as “quasirent” can only be 
realized between the involved parties (Backhaus & Büschken, 1999). By making specific 
investments for a customer, a supplier can help this particular customer in developing more 
efficient operations or in better differentiating its market offerings (Ghosh & John, 1999). 
Consequently, the creation of superior value increases the customer’s willingness to pay for 
the supplier’s offerings which results, in turn, in a higher customer lifetime value for the 
supplier. The same applies in converse when a customer specifically invests in a supplier. 
Transaction value analysis (TVA) argues that economic actors shape the governance 
structures of exchange based on value considerations more than on cost considerations (Zajac 
& Olsen, 1993). Firms maintain relationships to benefit from their positive outcomes 
(Lindgreen & Wynstra, 2005). This reflects in relationship marketing developments over the 
last two decades which rely on the premise that relational exchange generates superior value 
for involved parties compared to transactional exchange (e.g. Gummesson, 2004; Ravald & 
Grönroos, 1996; Sharma, et al., 1999). For instance, Kumar (1999) shows that service 
providers with a relational approach to their customers deliver superior value and achieve 
greater financial returns than firms with a transactional approach. Relationships reduce the 
direct and indirect costs for the buyer, which tends to increase the financial performance of 
the purchasing firm (Simpson, et al., 2001). Collaborating with a trade partner over time can 
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also generate value by favoring information acquisition and exchange. Ganesan (1994) shows 
positive correlations between the long-term orientation of relationships with the anticipated 
and actual performance of interdependent members within a distribution channel. Overall, 
interfirm cooperation in buyer-seller relationships is associated with a number of positive 
economic and non-economic outcomes (Anderson, Fornell, & Lehmann, 1994; Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, & Kumar, 1999). 
The concept of relationship value has emerged as an aggregate measure for 
relationship outputs (Corsaro & Snehota, 2010; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006). Relationship value 
can be defined as the sum of the benefits and cost reductions generated in an ongoing 
exchange with a business partner (Lefaix-Durand, Kozak, Beauregard, & Poulin, 2009). So 
far, research on relationship value is directed at better understanding the drivers of value 
creation within relationships (e.g. Lapierre, 2000; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006; Walter, et al., 2001; 
Zeithaml, 1988), the multidimensional and dynamic nature of value creation in business 
relationships (e.g. Beverland & Lockshin, 2003; Cannon & Homburg, 2001; Eggert, Ulaga, & 
Schultz, 2006; Flint, et al., 2002; Hogan, 2001), and the processes through which value 
develops (e.g. Lepak, Smith, & Taylor, 2007; Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004). Investigation 
of processes starts addressing the question for whom and by whom value is created in a 
relationship while studies conducted at the network and dyadic analysis levels highlight 
differences in value perceptions between buyers and sellers. These developments highlight the 
need to further investigate role differentials and their consequences on behaviors in 
relationships. 
 
2.4 Role Differences in Buyer-Seller Relationships 
 
Studies of value creation in business relationships are mainly conducted from either 
the customer perspective (e.g. Flint, et al., 2002; Lapierre, 2000; Parasuraman, 1997; Ravald 
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& Grönroos, 1996; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006) or the supplier perspective (e.g. Möller & 
Törrönen, 2003; Simpson, et al., 2001; Walter, et al., 2001). Very few dyadic studies on 
relationship value have considered both sides of particular relationships (Lefaix-Durand & 
Kozak, 2010). 
Yet, the literature provides a starting point to study role differences in RV between 
buyers and sellers: from a value chain perspective (Porter, 1985), as taken in this paper, the 
fundamental difference between a supplier and buyer is that a focal buyer-seller relationship is 
located toward the end of a supplier’s value chain and toward the outset of a buyer’s value 
chain.  
For supplying companies, a focal customer relationship has a direct impact on profits, 
and hence on maximizing shareholder value. The supplier delivers goods and services within 
this relationship, receives payment and makes profit. Walter et al. (2001) refer to this purpose 
as the profit function of the relationship. Other direct relationship functions from a supplier 
perspective include a volume function which contributes to a supplier’s capacity utilization, 
and a safeguarding function which helps protect the supplier against crises. Although 
suppliers profit from a buyer-seller relationship indirectly from learning (Cheung, Myers, & 
Mentzer, 2010), innovation, market intelligence, or by generating extra business as a door-
opener to other organizations, the direct functions have obvious impacts.  
Direct impacts of the relationship from a buyer’s perspective are, however, more 
diverse and early in its value chain: a buyer attempts to save costs in lower prices for goods 
and services, but also in the purchasing and supply process (Cousins & Spekman, 2003; Ulaga 
& Eggert, 2006). The buyer values flexibility and reliability of supply and needs to secure and 
improve quality levels of the supplied goods and services. Other direct functions include 
innovation and technology transfer as well as process innovation to shorten time-to-market 
and cycle times (Cousins & Spekman, 2003; Nyaga, Whipple, & Lynch, 2010). These 
benefits are dispersed in the value chain of the buying firm such as in purchasing, inbound 
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logistics, manufacturing and assembly, or research and development. Relationship value is 
therefore not as easily and unambiguously perceived by a buyer as by a seller. If the goals 
associated with a buyer-seller relationship from a buyer’s perspective are fulfilled, the 
relationship delivers high relationship value and contributes to the buying company’s 
economic success, but indirectly. 
From a buyer’s strategic perspective, intensifying a given relationship may help 
supplier-base consolidation, to decrease costs of handling a large supplier base (Swift & Coe, 
1994; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006). Intensification can also help secure valuable input resources 
and protect them from competitors’ use. Overall, establishment of collaborative buyer-seller 
relationships has gained importance over the last decade. Purchasing and supply chain 
management is nowadays considered strategic because of its manifold repercussions on a 
buying company’s own competitive advantage (Cousins & Spekman, 2003). 
Institutional considerations provide more arguments for role-specific differences in the 
perception of relationships: buyers’ and sellers’ rationales to bind themselves and be bound 
diverge. A buyer generally tries to avoid dependence on a particular supplier (Liu, Leach, & 
Bernhardt, 2005) but companies today tend to trade in some of their independence against 
cost savings by having fewer, heavily bound, high value suppliers (Swift & Coe, 1994). 
Suppliers, on the other hand, try to stabilize their customer base because customer retention is 
less costly than customer acquisition (Reichheld, 1993). Binding customers is therefore an 
important objective for suppliers. 
 
3. Hypotheses development: Buyers’ and Sellers’ Behavioral Intentions in Relationships 
 
Based on the review above, we develop hypotheses for the differential buyer-seller 
bonding effects of switching costs and relationship value on these outcomes: relationship 
enhancement, relational tolerance, search for alternatives and switch intention. They are 
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developed on the basis of clear indications in the literature and presented at the end of each 
subsection. 
 
3.1 Effects on Relationship Enhancement 
 
Bendapudi and Berry (1997) define relationship enhancement from a buyer’s 
perspective as “broadening and deepening the relational bonds with the service provider. 
That is, the customer makes investments in the relationship to enhance it beyond the status 
quo. These investments might include buying additional services, providing capital, 
information, manpower or other resources, or participating in company events” (p.29). This 
description also applies for suppliers: they generally try to leverage an existing relationship by 
cross-selling or offering new services (Davies, Brady, & Hobday, 2007), providing capital, 
information, and dedicated staff or adapting their production and logistics to customer 
demands (Tuli, Kohli, & Bharadwaj, 2007). However, the degree to which a customer or a 
supplier is ready to enhance their relationship varies according to the current state of their 
relationship. We first discuss the buyer side.  
If relationship value is high from a buyer’s perspective, the focal relationship strongly 
contributes to achieving company goals: the more value (in terms of cost savings, innovation, 
reliability, flexibility, etc.) the relationship produces, the more will the customer wish to 
enhance the relationship to obtain still more value.  
When a customer’s switching costs are already high, making more relationship-
specific investments would raise dependence on the particular supplier (Bendapudi & Berry, 
1997; Gounaris, 2005). Because buyers value independence, high switching costs will reduce 
their willingness to intensify the relationship. On the other hand, high switching costs 
decrease their ease of doing business with another supplier so in order to efficiently use 
resources they would rather intensify the current relationship than try to find alternative 
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partners. Thus, there exist arguments for both positive and negative influences of buyer 
switching costs on relationship enhancement. 
From the supplier perspective, the reasoning on relationship value effects is similar. If 
relationship value is high a supplier earns good profit, receives other benefits, and wants to 
enhance the relationship.  
Concerning supplier switching cost effects, the independence argument is not so 
important unless the supplier is heavily dependent on that particular customer. A supplier 
generally invests in a specific relationship in order to create additional value for the customer 
and thereby indirectly profit from higher customer’s willingness-to-pay. Hence, a higher 
current level of switching costs is expected to positively influence a supplier’s propensity for 
relationship enhancement. 
When comparing supplier and buyer perspectives, relationship value is anticipated to 
play the dominant role in determining relationship enhancement compared to switching cost 
effects. We propose switching costs as more important in explaining supplier relationship 
enhancement than buyer enhancement because the buyer likes independence. Consequently, 
we formulate the following hypotheses on relationship enhancement: 
H1a: Buyer perceived relationship value is positively associated with its intentions for 
relationship enhancement. 
H1b: Buyer perceived relationship value is more strongly (positively) associated with 
its intentions for relationship enhancement than are buyer switching costs. 
H1c: Supplier perceived relationship value is positively associated with its intentions 
for relationship enhancement. 
H1d: Supplier switching costs are positively associated with its intentions for 
relationship enhancement, albeit not as strongly as supplier perceived relationship value. 
H1e: Buyer switching costs are less related with its intentions for relationship 
enhancement than supplier switching costs with supplier relationship enhancement. 
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3.2 Effects on Relational Tolerance 
 
Business-to-business relationships experience conflict (Brown, Lusch, & Muehling, 
1983) and reasons why partners originally entered into the relationship become blurred. The 
strength of interfirm bonds determines the parties’ propensity to accept temporary 
disadvantages and exhibit relational tolerance (Anderson & Weitz, 1992). Buyers manifest 
tolerance by accepting some opportunism or unethical behavior (Fullerton, 2003; Ganesan, 
Brown, Mariadoss, & Ho, 2010), with higher willingness-to-pay (de Ruyter, et al., 1998), or 
by granting short-term financing aid to suppliers. A supplier exhibits relational tolerance by 
tolerating demands for price cuts or unpaid extra services, longer than agreed terms of 
payment, and other customer demands that decrease profit. 
High relationship value provides one explanation for buyers’ relational tolerance. 
Buyers in high-value supplier relationships tend to accept temporary disadvantages while the 
overall relationship value remains superior to alternative relationships. In many cases, 
however, higher relationship value means less supply independence for the buyer. If 
relationship value is threatened temporally, a buyer might try to avoid temporal 
disadvantages, independently of their perception of total relationship value, by showing 
psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966) and replying with more conflict (less tolerance). 
For switching costs from current to new supplier, as long as they are higher than the 
damage the buyer incurs by showing relational tolerance, it is better for the buyer to be 
tolerant than to switch. In comparing the differential effects of relationship value and 
switching costs on relational tolerance, prospect theory as a specification and extension of 
TCA’s assumption of bounded rationality sheds light on expected differences. According to 
the bounded rationality assumption, decision makers try to act rationally but are limited by 
their cognitive capacities. Prospect theory makes the similar assumption that “a 
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comprehensively inclusive context, which incorporates all the relevant details of the present 
situation as well as expectations of all future opportunities and risks” is highly unrealistic 
(Kahneman, 2003, p. 706). Indeed, the bounded rationality of decision makers often means 
“narrow framing”: evaluating consequences of decisions using current situations as reference 
points. Thus, they assess decisions and expected consequences in terms of changes, i.e. losses 
or gains, not in terms of final states of wealth. According to prospect theory, losses loom 
larger than gains of the same (monetary) amount (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Consequently, decision makers generally try harder to avert a loss than to achieve a gain of 
the same magnitude. 
A buyer does not willingly accept disadvantages. The buyer has two choices: to abide 
by the supplier’s demands and incur a relatively certain but limited temporal loss, or to resist 
the supplier’s demands and thereby create more conflict. Possibly, the supplier subsequently 
lowers or drops its demands or re-adapts its behaviors. However, the supplier might also 
break off the relationship (Alajoutsijärvi, Möller, &Tähtinen, 2000). This possibility makes a 
difference when comparing the effects of relationship value and switching costs on a buyer’s 
relational tolerance. Although relationship value is a positive bond and a gain for a buyer, that 
value possesses many manifestations within the buyer firm’s value chain, so a potential value 
loss is not so easily identified. Buyer switching costs, however, are easily perceived as 
potential losses. Since losses loom larger than gains (Kahneman, 2003), relinquishing 
relationship value gains appears less negative than switching cost losses if the relationship is 
broken off by the supplier. 
For supplier switching costs, similar arguments as for customers apply in many 
respects. Suppliers, similarly to buyers, are likely to accept temporary disadvantages in 
superior value relationships. Additionally, suppliers generally want to bind valuable 
customers even at the expense of a lower relationship value. We therefore propose that higher 
switching costs lead to higher relational tolerance. Comparing supplier perceived relationship 
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value and supplier switching costs, however, the arguments are slightly different than for the 
buyer. Supplier perceived relationship value has a more direct profit impact than buyer 
perceived relationship value (Walter et al., 2001; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006). A change in 
relationship value, e.g. when there is a chance that the relationship is broken off by the other 
party, can therefore be regarded as much more salient for the supplier than for the buyer. 
Also, the perception of buyer and seller switching costs – especially those depending on 
specific investments – differs between buyers and sellers. Suppliers regard specific 
investments as a means to bind customers (Kleinaltenkamp & Ehret, 2006). They do not 
worry about independence. Their concern regarding incurring switching costs results only 
from the possibility of being exploited. Hence we expect that the possibility of incurring 
switching costs due to relationship termination does not loom as large for a supplier as for a 
buyer. We summarize our discussion of relational tolerance antecedents in the following 
hypotheses: 
H2a: Buyer perceived relationship value is positively associated with its relational 
tolerance. 
H2b: Buyer switching costs are more positively associated with relational tolerance 
than is buyer perceived relationship value. 
H2c: Supplier perceived relationship value is positively associated with its relational 
tolerance. 
H2d: Supplier switching costs are positively associated with its relational tolerance. 
H2e: Supplier perceived relationship value has a greater impact on supplier relational 
tolerance than buyer perceived relationship value on buyer relational tolerance; whereas 
supplier switching costs have a lesser impact on supplier relational tolerance than buyer 
switching costs on buyer relational tolerance. 
 
3.3 Effects on Search for Alternatives 
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Searching for alternatives as an intention in a relationship can be a means of 
complementing the current base of business partners, the first step to replacing an existing 
relationship or a method to improve one’s own position within an existing relationship by 
stimulating the current partner to continuously stay ahead of alternative business partners. 
According to Bendapudi and Berry (1997) a general search tendency can be observed: 
no customer is blind to alternative suppliers. In constraint-based relationships, customers 
exhibit a higher tendency to search for alternatives than do customers in dedication based 
relationships (Bendapudi & Berry, 1997). Eggert and Ulaga (2003) find a strong negative 
association between customer-perceived value and search for alternatives, indicating that the 
higher relationship value for a customer is, the less likely it is to search for alternative 
suppliers. 
Turning to customer switching costs, the picture is not that clear. On the one hand, 
customers with high switching costs have made relationship specific investments. These 
investments only pay off when the current relationship is maintained. On the other hand, 
buyers generally value their independence from a particular supplier. Searching for 
alternatives while facing high switching costs in specific relationships could be a suitable 
balancing measure to reestablish the desired independence.  
The effects of relationship value on search for alternatives should be similar for sellers 
as for buyers. Indeed, high value relationships with customers directly contribute to corporate 
goals and should reduce suppliers’ tendency to search for alternative business partners.  
The effects of switching costs on sellers’ intentions to search for alternatives, however, 
are likely to be different than for buyers. First, searching for alternatives takes a different 
meaning from a supplier’s standpoint. Sellers are more likely to search for alternative 
customers in order to stabilize, broaden or complement their customer base, rather than to 
switch and “replace” existing customers (Tähtinen & Halinen, 2002). Hence, overall 
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intentions to search for alternatives would be stronger for sellers than for buyers. Second, 
most supplier switching costs relate heavily to relationship specific investments. A supplier 
makes these investments to create more value for the customer and indirectly create more 
value for itself. However, the higher its switching costs are the higher is the amount at stake 
and the higher the risk that the customer appropriates some of the available quasirent. By 
searching for and developing alternative customer relationships into which specific 
investments can be redeployed, suppliers can decrease the risk of being exploited. We express 
our discussion on search for alternatives in the following hypotheses: 
H3a: Buyer perceived relationship value is negatively associated with its tendency to 
search for alternatives. 
H3b: Buyer perceived relationship value is more strongly (negatively) associated with 
its tendency to search for alternatives than are buyer switching costs. 
H3c: Supplier perceived relationship value is negatively associated with its tendency 
to search for alternatives. 
H3d: Supplier switching costs are positively associated with its tendency to search for 
alternatives. 
 
3.4 Effects on Switch Intention 
 
The most radical behavioral consequence in a buyer-seller relationship which we 
investigate is a business partner’s intention to terminate the current relationship and replace it 
with another partner, which we label switch intention. Conceptually, it is the opposite of 
(customer) loyalty. However, since switching means changing the status quo, switch intention 
seems to be a more meaningful dependent variable than loyalty: business partners have to 
actively pursue a switch whereas staying loyal can happen out of inertia. As a potential 
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outcome of buyer-seller relationships, switch intention has been used before (e.g. de Ruyter, 
et al., 2001; Morgan & Hunt, 1994), but certainly less frequently than loyalty. 
From the buyer’s point of view, switching to alternative suppliers is normally hindered 
by the value of the existing relationships. The higher the value of a supply relationship is, the 
lower the buyer’s intention to terminate and replace the relationship. In the same vein, 
switching costs are assumed to dampen a buyer’s switch intentions. Further, relationship 
value should have a stronger effect on switch intentions than switching costs. While 
considering an alternative supplier, a buyer will most likely compare the value of the existing 
and potential relationships before even considering the costs incurred by switching. If the 
value of the existing relationship is satisfying (given ‘comparison level’) or if the value 
differential is not high enough, the customer will probably just abandon any intention to 
switch. 
In the case of sellers, the termination of customer relationships is still rather 
uncommon, even in unsatisfactory buyer-seller relationships (Backhaus & Büschken, 1999). 
We hence expect a low level of supplier switch intention, since customer loyalty is generally 
regarded as favorable by suppliers. Of course, when a given relationship offers the supplier 
higher relationship value, its switch intention would further decrease. Along the same lines we 
expect supplier switching costs to be negatively associated with their switch intentions. All 
arguments on switch intention taken together, we hypothesize: 
H4a: Buyer perceived relationship value is negatively associated with its switch 
intentions. 
H4b: Buyer switching costs are negatively associated with its switch intention, albeit 
not as strongly as buyer perceived relationship value. 
H4c: Supplier perceived relationship value has a mild negative association with its 
switch intention. 
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H4d: Supplier switching costs have a mild negative association with its switch 
intention. 
H4e: Buyer perceived relationship value and buyer switching costs exert a greater 
negative influence on buyer switch intention than do supplier perceived relationship value and 
supplier switching costs on supplier switch intention. 
 
4. Method 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
 
To enhance generalizability of our results we tested our hypotheses using data 
gathered in a survey of purchasing managers and marketing/sales managers in four countries: 
Germany, Korea, New Zealand, and Argentina. The survey used the key informant technique 
where a knowledgeable company representative acts as a respondent for his or her 
organization (Campbell, 1955). As we do not compare buyers’ and the suppliers’ reports 
within dyads, we collected data from purchasing and marketing/sales managers independently 
(Heide & John, 1995). 
In order to keep response rates at an acceptable level a rather short questionnaire was 
used. It was first administered in Germany, utilizing both established and newly developed 
measures. The instrument was then translated into English. The proper connotations and 
idiomatic language use were assured by either using the original English language scales or 
by discussing the meanings and connotations of the English compared to the German version 
with the involved researchers. For Korea and Argentina, the instrument was translated from 
English into Korean and Spanish and back translated to check for correctness. In Argentina, 
both the English and the Spanish version were available for respondents.  
22 
 
In all countries, the survey instrument was administered as a pencil & paper exercise 
by mail. In case of no response one reminder was sent. In Germany, purchasing managers 
were also handed out the survey in person at a trade fair; however, they completed the 
questionnaire in private and sent it back by mail. In Korea, respondents could also send back 
the completed questionnaire by e-mail or fax. In Argentina, an online survey was run in 
parallel to increase response rates at an acceptable cost and in an unproblematic manner 
(Deutskens, de Jong, de Ruyter, & Wetzels, 2006). In New Zealand, the initial questionnaire 
mail-outs were followed by a reminder letter to increase response rate. Key informant 
addresses mainly originated from mailing lists available at the authors’ academic institutions, 
from commercial data base providers or trade associations. This way a cross-sectional sample 
with responses from a wide range of industries and company sizes could be drawn, increasing 
generalizability. As incentives to the respondents, exclusive results reports were offered as 
well as the participation in a raffle where survey participants could win Amazon.com 
vouchers. 
In the survey, respondents were asked to answer the questions with regard to one 
specific supplier or customer relationship. To obtain sufficient variance for effective analysis, 
we randomly asked one half of the respondents to select a well-functioning relationship as the 
questionnaire subject and the other half a rather problematic one (for a similar procedure see 
Tellefsen & Thomas, 2005).2 Overall response rates were satisfactory at a level of 18.20 % for 
sellers and 10.93 % for buyers. Respondent and company details can be seen in Table 1.  
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
4.2 Measures 
                                                            
2 For well-functioning relationships, the wording was “Please consider a relationship with one customer in your 
area of responsibility which is very satisfying and highly successful from the point of view of your organisation 
(for example, an “A” customer, or key account).” In the case of problematic relationships respondents were 
asked: “Please consider a relationship with one customer in your area of responsibility in which your company 
has made substantial investments but which is not satisfying and does not correspond to the expectations of 
your organisation.” 
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For our two exogenous constructs, relationship value and switching costs, multi-item 
scales were used in order to fully assess the construct domains, while all dependent measures 
were taken as meaningful single item measures. The object of this study’s questionnaire is a 
single clearly-identified buyer-seller relationship for each respondent, and hence is “concrete” 
(Rossiter, 2002). The attributes assessed for the dependent variables are of the type that have 
little disagreement between raters, so are also deemed concrete. In this situation of concrete 
object and attributes, there do not appear to be disadvantages (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007): in 
fact, it is preferable to use single items, as do Bolton, Smith, and Wagner (2003) and 
Palmatier (2008), because multiple items would simply be synonyms. As Rossiter (p. 314) 
notes, a set of synonyms tends to reduce rather than enhance validity. The exact wording of 
all items can be found in the appendix. 
Since we had collected data in four different countries, we needed to establish 
comparability of the measures before analysis. Following the set of steps proposed by 
Steenkamp & Baumgartner (1998) we established configural and partial metric measurement 
invariance for the multi-item measures in the different countries. We could thus subsequently 
analyze the data together (Cannon & Homburg, 2001). 
To assess construct reliability and validity of the independent variables, we estimated 
a confirmatory factor analysis based on the total sample. The chi-square test is statistically 
significant (χ²(34) = 145.69, p < .01) while the normed fit index (NFI), the Tucker-Lewis fit 
index (TLI) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) indicated satisfactory 
model fit (NFI = .963, TLI = .953, RMSEA = .061). All indicator reliabilities were above the 
recommended threshold value of .4 (Baumgartner & Homburg, 1996, see appendix). For 
relationship value, the average variance extracted (AVE) was .53, for switching cost it 
equaled .54, exceeding the critical value of .50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Factor reliability 
equaled .92 for relationship value and .82 for switching costs, both above the recommended 
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threshold of .60. Coefficient alpha was .87 for relationship value and .82 for switching costs. 
Discriminant validity was assessed according to the Fornell-Larcker criterion: every 
construct’s AVE is higher than the highest squared correlation with any other construct 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981). After validation of the measurement models we summated the 
items for each construct in line with Cannon and Homburg (2001) and Ulaga and Eggert 
(2006). We thus circumvented the problematic instability of factor scores across different sub-
samples as well as the problems attached to measurement model invariance (Steenkamp & 
Baumgartner, 1998) when comparing different groups, such as buyers and sellers. 
 
5. Results 
 
Descriptive statistics for the supplier and buyer samples are displayed in Table 2. 
Zero-order correlations between IVs and DVs in both sub-samples are in the hypothesized 
directions for all DVs and statistically significant at p < .001.  
In the following presentation of results, subscripts are used to denote the respective 
figures for buyer (subscript “b”) and sellers (subscript “s”). While suppliers tend to have a 
perception of higher relationship value (Ms = 5.23) and switching costs (Ms = 4.43) in a given 
relationship than buyers (relationship value: Mb = 4.53, switching costs: Mb = 4.05), they also 
show higher scores on intentions for relationship enhancement (Ms = 5.50 vs. Mb = 4.41), 
relational tolerance (Ms = 4.79 vs. Mb = 3.87) and a lower switch intention (Ms = 2.77 vs. Mb 
= 3.45). All mean differences between suppliers and buyers except for search for alternatives 
are significant at p < .001. This observation is a first hint that overall a customer relationship 
is more important to the supplier than a supplier relationship is to a customer. Another piece 
of evidence along that line is provided by comparing zero-order correlations between IVs and 
DVs in the supplier and buyer samples: except for relational tolerance, correlations between 
IVs and DVs are stronger in the buyer sample. This indicates that a buyer’s behavioral 
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intentions in a buyer-seller relationship depend more on the state of the relationship than a 
seller’s intentions.  
Insert table 2 around here 
For hypothesis testing we computed regressions for each dependent variable (DV) and 
each sub-sample (buyers, sellers) separately: the DV was regressed on relationship value and 
switching costs. For exploratory purposes we also included a standardized interaction term for 
relationship value and switching costs. The heterogeneity of our data made it necessary to 
control for various influences which included company size (in terms of turnover) as well as 
dummy controls for Korea, New Zealand and Argentina (the German data being the biggest 
country specific sub-sample was used as the reference group; c.f. Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2010) and relationship phase prior to termination. Industry dummies did not prove 
meaningful control variables. To account for possible strength differences of the regression 
coefficients of our independent variables (IV) in the different subgroups, we also included 
interaction effects between each control variable (CV) and each IV. The general regression 
equation had the following form: 
𝐷𝑉 = 𝛽� + 𝛽� ∙ 𝑅𝑉 + 𝛽� ∙ 𝑆𝑤𝐶 + 𝛽� ∙ 𝑅𝑉 × 𝑆𝑤𝐶
+�(𝛽�� ∙ 𝐶𝑉� + 𝛽�� ∙ 𝐶𝑉� × 𝑅𝑉 + 𝛽�� ∙ 𝐶𝑉� × 𝑆𝑤𝐶 + 𝛽�� ∙ 𝐶𝑉� × 𝑅𝑉 × 𝑆𝑤𝐶)�
���
 
In this equation DV denominates the relevant dependent variable (relationship 
enhancement, relational tolerance, search for alternatives, switch intention), RV denotes 
relationship value, SwC signifies switching costs, RV x SwC marks the interaction between 
the two, CVi are relevant control variables, numbering m. The intercept is denoted as β0, the 
weights β1 - β3 mark the weight of the independent variables, whereas βai signify the direct 
influences of control variables, with βbi, βci and βdi indicating the weight of interaction terms 
between independent and control variables. Table 3 displays the results of the regression 
analyses by each of the study’s four DVs. Table 4 presents an overview of the findings for 
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each of the four sets of hypotheses which are now discussed as in the order of the columns in 
Table 3 and the rows in Table 4, starting with relationship enhancement. Influences of control 
variables can be traced in Table 3 and are discussed in an exemplary manner at the end of this 
section. 
Insert table 3 around here 
Supporting H1a, we find a positive association between buyer perceived relationship 
value and relationship enhancement (β1b = .58, p < .01). Buyer switching costs also have a 
positive relation with relationship enhancement (β2b = .24, p < .01), albeit not as strong as 
relationship value, supporting H1b. Similarly in the supplier sample, relationship value (β1s = 
.53, p < .01) and switching costs (β2s = .08, p < .1) are positively associated with relationship 
enhancement, supporting H1c and H1d. Contrary to H1e, buyer switching costs exert a greater 
influence on buyer relationship enhancement than do supplier switching costs on supplier 
relationship enhancement (β2b = .24 vs. β2s = .08). According to the non-parametric procedure 
for multi-group analysis (PLS-MGA) proposed by Henseler, Ringle and Sinkovics (2009), 
this difference is significant at p<.05.  
Regarding relational tolerance, we did not find support for H2a which predicted a 
positive association between buyer perceived relationship value and relational tolerance (β1b = 
.04, n.s.). The positive association between buyer switching costs and relational tolerance (β2b 
= .48, p < .01) as well as the stronger influence of switching costs compared to relationship 
value (β2b = .48 vs. β1b = .04) support H2b. H2c, predicting a positive effect of supplier 
perceived relationship value on relational tolerance (β1s = .27, p < .01) as well as H2d, 
expecting a similar effect of supplier switching costs (β2s = .31, p < .01), were substantiated. 
In accordance with H2e, supplier perceived relationship value had a greater impact on 
supplier relational tolerance than buyer perceived relationship value (β1s = .27 vs. β1b = .04) 
whereas supplier switching costs had a smaller effect than buyer switching costs (β2s = .31 vs. 
β2b = .48, p < .05). 
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Turning to search for alternatives, the negative association with buyer perceived 
relationship value (β1b = -.25, p < .01) supports H3a. H3b predicted that from a buyer’s 
perspective, relationship value is more strongly (negatively) associated with search for 
alternatives than switching costs. Since there is no significant effect of switching costs (β2b = -
.02, n.s.) H3b is also supported (β1b = -.25 vs. β2b = -.02). On the supplier side, relationship 
value had a negative (β1s = -.20, p < .01) and switching costs a slight positive association (β1s 
= .13, p < .01) with search for alternatives, supporting H3c and H3d, respectively.  
The last DV in our analysis was switch intention. For buyers, relationship value was 
more strongly negatively related to switch intention (β1b = -.33, p < .01) than were switching 
costs (β2b = -.15, p < .01) supporting H4a and H4b. Interestingly, switch intention in the buyer 
sample is the only place we find an interaction effect between relationship value and 
switching costs (β3b = -.17, p < .01): high switching costs and high relationship value 
combined contribute over-proportionally to a lower switch intention. Supporting H4c and 
H4d, we found slight negative associations between relationship value and switch intention 
(β1s = -.16, p < .01) as well as switching costs and switch intention (β1s = -.14, p < .01) for 
suppliers. H4e predicted a greater dependence of buyers’ switch intentions on relationship 
value and switching cost than suppliers’ switch intentions. For relationship value, this claim is 
corroborated (β1b = -.33 vs. β1s = -.16, p > .05), whereas the differentiating effects of 
switching costs are not significant (β2b = -.15 vs. β1s = -.14). Thus, H4e is partly supported. 
Insert table 4 around here. 
Since we use data from all countries for hypothesis testing we also account for 
possible, non-hypothesized differences between countries in two ways. First, using country 
dummies for Korea, New Zealand, and Argentina (Germany being the reference group) 
accounts for different levels of the dependent variable in each country compared to the 
German sample. In technical terms, the regression coefficient for each country dummy 
represents an additional sub-sample specific intercept in the regression equation. For example, 
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in the supplier sub-sample Argentine suppliers display a significantly lower level of search for 
alternatives than German suppliers (β7s = -.38), while Korean buyers showed a higher level of 
switch intention than German ones (β5b = .33). These significant regression coefficients do not 
influence our hypotheses tests. Second, we include interaction terms between control 
variables and predictor variables to control for possibly different influence strengths of 
predictor on dependent variables depending on the level of control variables. Technically 
speaking, the regression coefficient of such a predictor-control interaction alters the slope of 
the predictor variable in the regression equation depending on the level of the control variable. 
This analysis reveals for example that the non-existent influence of switching costs on search 
for alternatives in the buyer sample (β2b = -.02, n.s.) might be significant in Korea (β15b = -.18, 
p < .01), New Zealand (β16b = -.14, p < .05) or Argentina (β17b = -.17, p < .01). Other 
significant main effects might be reduced by the control interactions, e.g. the influence of 
relationship value on search for alternatives in the supplier sample in Korea (β1s = -.20 vs. β10s 
= .24, p < .01). 
 
6. Discussion 
 
6.1 General discussion 
 
The results of our study demonstrate that important differences exist between buyers’ 
and sellers’ approaches to buyer-seller relationships. This is a first major contribution of the 
paper. Overall, the importance of such a relationship to a supplier seems to be higher than to a 
buyer. Also, suppliers’ behavioral intentions rely less on the current state of the relationship 
than do buyers’ intentions: if the relationship does not perform that well, in value terms, then 
buyers are a lot less inclined to enhance the relationship and are quicker to search for 
alternative business partners or to walk away than are suppliers. For a supplier, current 
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relationship value and switching costs also play a role in their future intentions, albeit 
generally to a lesser degree. For suppliers, customer retention is a major marketing goal from 
which they deviate only in very bad current relationship conditions. 
A second major contribution of the paper concerns the role that switching costs and 
relationship value play as bonding mechanisms in buyer-seller relationships. Overall, 
relationship value is a stronger predictor than switching costs for relationship enhancement, 
search for alternatives and switch intention in both the buyer and the supplier sample. This 
finding challenges traditional TCA reasoning and enhances TVA, emphasizing value as a 
stronger behavioral driver than costs. The reversal of influence strength of relationship value 
and switching costs on relational tolerance in both buyer and supplier sub-samples is an 
indication that prospect theoretical reasoning helps to more precisely define what TCA means 
by bounded rationality. As we observed, losses can loom larger than gains of the same 
amount, so relinquishing the gains of relationship value by breaking off the relationship can 
appear less negative than incurring the loss of switching costs. 
Despite the support for most of our hypotheses, some predictions had to be rejected. 
H1e proposed that buyer switching costs are less related to buyer intentions for relationship 
enhancement than are seller switching costs for seller intentions for relationship enhancement. 
However, we found the exact opposite. The overall level of switching costs among buyers and 
sellers might help our understanding. Seller switching costs are generally higher than buyer 
switching costs in our sample. Since relationship enhancement is associated with deploying 
more relationships specific assets, sellers might be more anxious not to increase an already 
high level of switching costs even more. Buyers in our sample, however, seem to have more 
leeway. A second surprising result concerned the positively expected, but non-existent 
relationship between buyer perceived relationship value and relational tolerance. However, as 
our data suggest, relationship value is not relevant for a buyer’s intention to temporarily incur 
a disadvantage. One possible explanation would be an act of defiance on the part of the buyer: 
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the buyer might feel its freedom of choice threatened and therefore display strong reactance 
(Brehm, 1966), not calm economic thinking. Certainly, these two unexpected findings warrant 
more attention and further research. 
 
6.2 Managerial implications 
Some interesting managerial implications come from our empirical findings for 
marketing/sales and purchasing/supply managers alike. For suppliers, customer relationships 
generally offer direct profit impact and should hence be guarded and stabilized. For doing so, 
enhancing customer perceived relationship value is more effective than increasing customer 
switching costs. Marketing and sales managers are thus advised to permanently devise and 
perform activities to increase and demonstrate relationship value for their customers. 
Examples include  
• introducing value-adding services to complement functional base products, 
• streamlining the supply process, 
• devising measures to improve the customers’ operation processes, 
• offering the supplier’s know-how and ability to shorten a customer’s time to 
market, and 
• fostering personal interactions on the different levels of the buying/selling 
centers in order to make the value added visible. 
Despite the importance of buyer perceived relationship value for stabilizing a 
customer relationship, suppliers should not be blinded by its generally stabilizing effect. 
When customers are faced with perceived unethical supplier behavior or extra demands, e.g. 
higher prices or longer terms of payment, their relational tolerance toward a given supplier 
might be quickly exhausted even when customer perceived relationship value is high. Such 
changes from the status quo are only tolerated with increased customer switching costs. 
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A last implication for suppliers relates to our findings about switch intentions. We 
found a very low level of switch intention among suppliers; switch intention is also only 
mildly dependent on the level of supplier perceived relationship value and switching costs. 
These results indicate that only few companies re-evaluate their customer base on a regular 
basis and some might even end up in a “loyalty trap”, where customers are kept despite low 
or negative relationship value. One reason might be that managers invest very little time and 
resources in each of those low value relationships so that an active change of the status quo is 
not deemed necessary.3 Nevertheless, to avoid this trap, we advise managers to continuously 
monitor their customer base for the value that each relationship contributes and also 
ultimately consider supplier initiated relationship termination. 
The initial situation for buying companies and purchasing/supply managers is 
different. A purchasing company enters into a supplier relationship to extract superior value 
and to keep costs of handling a large supplier base low. Our research shows that supplier 
perceived relationship value drives suppliers’ relationship enhancement more than supplier 
switching costs and also reduces supplier intentions to search for and ultimately switch to 
other partners. We thus advise purchasing and supply managers to devise relational 
arrangements where the supplier perceives a high relationship value. Paying a fair price and 
leveraging other possibilities to increase value to the supplier (e.g. guarantee minimum 
purchasing volumes, transfer know how for process improvements, grant access to other 
market actors) are a more promising strategy than to try to increase supplier switching costs. 
Suppliers then are more prone to intensify the existing relationship and in turn deliver more 
value to the buying firm. Although supplier switching costs caused by relationship specific 
investments might be needed to produce the expected value for a purchasing firm, insisting on 
more specific investments to increase buyer perceived value causes higher supplier switching 
costs and subsequently leads to the supplier searching for alternative, parallel business 
                                                            
3 We thank one anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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partners. If the search is successful, the supplier might decrease its endeavors in the focal 
customer relationship and the purchasing firm might have arrived at the opposite effects it 
originally wished for. 
Since our research has captured relationship value and switching costs at a rather 
abstract level, we urge marketing/sales and purchasing/supply managers alike to be clear 
about what exactly constitutes relationship value to their firm and their business partner’s 
firm. Unambiguous value perceptions on both sides and mutual value creation are the 
cornerstone of long-lasting and successful buyer-seller relationships. 
 
6.3 Limitations and further research 
The design of our study certainly bears some limitations which offer avenues for 
further research. Overall, the present study has taken a rather abstract view of buyer-supplier 
relationships. This made it possible to argue from an economic perspective focusing on buyer 
and seller companies as the economic actors in our analysis. A second choice we took was to 
stay in one theoretical paradigm, TCA/TVA, as the backdrop to our theory development.  
Of course these choices precluded us from looking closer at possible role-specific 
influences of such constructs as satisfaction, trust, communication or personal bonds. These 
operate mainly on the person-to-person or person-to-company level (e.g. Palmatier, Scheer, & 
Steenkamp, 2007) and would certainly offer complementary insights on role differences in 
buyer-seller relationships in future studies. We also recognize that other theoretical 
approaches such as power-dependence theory (Emerson, 1962) might additionally shed light 
on the phenomena in our analysis.  
A second shortcoming of our rather abstract approach might be seen in that we define 
and outline the concepts of switching costs and relationship value but do not provide exact 
instructions on how to compute or estimate them in practice. A more detailed analysis of these 
aspects could, however, provide new insights, e.g. if a company detailed all elements of a net 
33 
 
present value calculus for customer valuation (e.g. cash flows and probabilities) or even used 
a real-option valuation approach (Haenlein, Kaplan, & Schoder, 2006). If such a more 
detailed valuation approach was implemented within a company, analyzing synergistic value 
effects of different buyer-seller relationships in a company’s portfolio (e.g. increased 
absorptive capacity) could also be a worthwhile endeavor. 
A third interesting avenue for further research can be seen in a moderator analysis 
studying conditions under which the results reported here might change. We have already 
pointed out that some country specific differences exist. Detailing these and investigating 
them along with other potential moderators would be one next step. 
From a methodological point of view, we used separate buyer and seller data sets to 
examine our hypotheses. Further insights, e.g. of perceptions by business partners and their 
interconnections, could be gained by using dyadic data in a similar setting. 
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APPENDIX 
Measures 
 
Relationship value 
Factor 
loadings 
Indicator 
reliability 
RV_1 This relationship has an outstanding value to us. .75 .56 
RV_2 All in all, the benefits of this relationship far outweigh the disadvantages. .67 .45 
RV_3 This customer/supplier relationship makes a crucial positive contribution to our company’s success. .81 .65 
RV_4 
This relationship makes a crucial positive 
contribution to our company’s achievement of 
goals. 
.81 .65 
RV_5 This relationship strongly matches our conception of an optimal relationship. .63 .40 
RV_6 This relationship meets the requirements of my company in all important aspects. .68 .47 
    Switching Costs 
  
SwC_1 
The sum of disadvantages associated with a 
potential switch to another customer/supplier is 
probably very high. 
.66 .44 
SwC_2 My company would lose a lot by switching to another customer/supplier. .73 .53 
SwC_3 
Overall, I guess the costs (time, effort and money) 
to switch to another relationship would be very 
high. 
.77 .59 
SwC_4 
Altogether, the barriers for my company to 
terminate the current relationship and establish an 
alternative relationship would be very high. 
.77 .60 
    Endogenous measures 
  Relationship 
Enhancement 
I guess my company would be willing to intensify the relationship with this 
customer/supplier. 
Relational 
Tolerance 
I guess my company would be ready to temporarily accept disadvantages in 
the current relationship in order to maintain it. 
Search for 
Alternatives 
My company actively searches for alternative options to be able to replace 
the existing relationship. 
Switch 
intention 
I guess my company will try to substitute the current relationship with an 
alternative relationship in the near future. 
 
43 
 
TABLE 1 
Sample characteristics 
 
    Supplier sample Buyer sample 
  
 
Total GER KOR NZ ARG Total GER KOR NZ ARG 
Total responses [#] 521 194 120 73 134 373 105 120 52 96 
Response rate [%] 18.20% 18.90% 17.40% 13.01% 22.9% 10.93% 6.50% 15.10% 9.37% 21.4% 
Industry [%] 
Chemical. Utilities. Energy 16.2% 9.3% 32.5% 4.2% 17.9% 22.8% 9.5% 38.3% 7.7% 26,0% 
Mechanical 13.1% 29.9% 5.8% 2.8% .7% 9.7% 20.0% 11.7% 1.9% ,0% 
Electronics & electrical 10.2% 14.9% 8.3% 7.0% 6.7% 11.3% 14.3% 12.5% 13.5% 5,2% 
Automotive 7.3% 10.8% 8.3% 4.2% 3.0% 7.2% 11.4% 8.3% 3.8% 3,1% 
FMCG & Retail 8.9% 5.2% .0% 12.7% 20.1% 9.1% 3.8% .0% 15.4% 22,9% 
Construction  6.2% 5.2% 7.5% 12.7% 3.0% 6.4% 10.5% 7.5% 1.9% 3,1% 
Technical services 11.6% 8.2% 20.8% 12.7% 7.5% 10.5% 9.5% 11.7% 21.2% 4,2% 
Professional services 9.6% 3.6% 11.7% 8.5% 17.2% 7.8% 9.5% 3.3% 5.8% 12,5% 
Telecoms& IT 9.4% 8.2% 3.3% 5.6% 18.7% 6.4% 6.7% 1.7% 3.8% 13,5% 
Other  7.5% 4.6% 1.7% 29.6% 5.2% 8.8% 4.8% 5.0% 25.0% 9,4% 
Company size  
[# employees] 
up to 50 19.8% 18.6% 5.8% 38.4% 23.9% 13.4% 15.2% .8% 36.5% 14,6% 
51 to 100 11.9% 12.4% 2.5% 19.2% 15.7% 9.7% 11.4% 2.5% 17.3% 12,5% 
101 to 500 33.8% 39.7% 30.8% 30.1% 29.9% 29.5% 27.6% 28.3% 30.8% 32,3% 
501 to 1,000 10.4% 6.7% 22.5% 6.8% 6.7% 17.4% 12.4% 26.7% 7.7% 16,7% 
1,001 to 5,000 15.9% 12.4% 31.7% 5.5% 12.7% 21.4% 19.0% 33.3% 7.7% 16,7% 
more than 5,000 8.3% 10.3% 6.7% .0% 11.2% 8.6% 14.3% 8.3% .0% 7,3% 
Relationship duration [years] 11.83 11.99 12.85 12.71 10.22 9.88 9.78 9.00 10.16 10.93 
Relationship phase 
(extended) start up 24.2% 26.3% 21.7% 13.7% 29.1% 22.0% 22.9% 25.8% 7.7% 24,0% 
consolidated 72.0% 67.5% 75.8% 86.3% 67.2% 66.8% 62.9% 67.5% 73.1% 66,7% 
prior to termination 3.8% 6.2% 2.5% .0% 3.7% 11.3% 14.3% 6.7% 19.2% 9,4% 
Respondent time with company [years] 6.65 7.16 6.87 6.42 5.85 6.33 6.16 5.95 9.13 5.46 
Respondent time in current position [years] 5.90 7.02 4.45 6.51 5.26 4.82 5.24 3.58 6.79 4.84 
Respondent familiarity with relationship 5.52 5.54 5.48 5.64 5.46 5.35 5.40 5.38 5.90 4.96 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics: Means, standard deviations and zero-order correlations. 
 
  
Supplier sample 
  
M SD 
 
A B C D E F 
A Relationship value 5.23 1.08 
 
1.00 
     B Switching costs 4.43 1.37 
 
.46 1.00 
    C Relationship enhancement 5.50 1.32  .58 .31 1.00    
D Relational tolerance 4.79 1.43 
 
.44 .44 .41 1.00 
  E Search for alternatives 4.21 1.96 
 
-.21 .04^ -.17 -.06^ 1.00 
 F Switch intention 2.77 1.90 
 
-.24 -.18 -.21 -.23 .08* 1.00 
  
Buyer sample 
  
M SD 
 
A B C D E F 
A Relationship value 4.53 1.27 
 
1.00 
     B Switching costs 4.05 1.35 
 
.51 1.00 
    C Relationship enhancement 4.41 1.53  .71 .50 1.00    
D Relational tolerance 3.87 1.49 
 
.28 .39 .32 1.00 
  E Search for alternatives 4.18 1.78 
 
-.38 -.25 -.29 -.09* 1.00 
 F Switch intention 3.45 1.88 
 
-.50 -.33 -.45 -.15** .41 1.00 
** p < .05   * p < .1   ^ not significant 
Summated item scores for relationship value and switching costs were divided by the number 
of items for comparability. All zero-order correlations are significant at p < .001 except for the 
ones denoted. All means are significantly different between suppliers and buyers at p < .001 
except for search for alternatives where there is no significant difference. 
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TABLE 3 
Regression coefficients 
 
 
 
Supplier sample Buyer sample 
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 Adjusted R² .36 .30 .24 .29 .52 .27 .23 .38 
No. IVs and CVs β β β β β β β β 
1 Relationship value (RV) .53*** .27*** -.20*** -.16*** .58*** .04 -.25*** -.33*** 
2 Switching costs (SwC) .08* .31*** .13*** -.14*** .24*** .48*** -.02 -.15*** 
3 Interaction RV x SwC -.03 -.02 -.07 .08 .03 -.07 -.02 -.17*** 
4 Turnover (TO) -.08 -.04 -.07 -.02 .07 -.33 -.21 .15 
5 Korea dummy (KOR) .02 -.16*** .04 .42*** .07 -.05 -.04 .33*** 
6 New Zealand dummy (NZ) .03 -.08 -.18*** .34*** -.03 .02 -.17*** .23*** 
7 Argentina dummy (ARG) .07 -.24*** -.38*** .34*** -.03 -.20*** -.21*** .24*** 
8 Termination phase (TP) -.07 -.01 .06 .06 -.12 .22** .29*** .21** 
9 TO x RV .17 .25 -.09 -.03 .25 -.03 .27 .30 
10 KOR x RV .03 -.04 .24*** .05 -.01 .06 .27*** .04 
11 NZ x RV -.03 .02 .05 .00 .02 -.03 .13** -.02 
12 ARG x RV .04 .02 .08 -.02 .02 -.06 .18*** -.04 
13 TP x RV .04 -.01 -.09 -.02 -.05 .17** .35*** -.01 
14 TO x SwC -.26 -.28 .14 .09 -.07 .37 .16 -.24 
15 KOR x SwC .06 .00 -.20*** -.10* -.02 -.33*** -.18*** -.02 
16 NZ x SwC .08 .01 .05 .04 -.02 -.09 -.14** .05 
17 ARG x SwC .00 -.07 -.18*** .03 -.06 .01 -.17*** .06 
18 TP x SwC .10 .00 .14 -.14 .15 .34*** -.05 -.14 
19 TO x RV x SwC .34 .45** -.23 -.11 -.22 -.02 -.40* -.20 
20 KOR x RV x SwC .11*** .05 -.01 -.03 .01 -.05 -.01 -.22*** 
21 NZ x RV x SwC .06 .00 -.01 -.05 .00 .05 -.08 -.14*** 
22 ARG x RV x SwC .09* .05 .09* -.03 .06 .07 .01 -.07 
23 TP x RV x SwC .22*** -.01 .06 -.06 .19** .39*** .07 -.21** 
*** p<.01   ** p<.05   * p <.1 
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TABLE 4 
Overview of hypotheses 
 
No. Hypothesis Result 
 
Relationship enhancement 
 H1a Buyer perceived relationship value is positively associated with its intentions for relationship enhancement. supported 
H1b Buyer perceived relationship value is more strongly (positively) associated with its intentions for relationship enhancement than are buyer switching costs. supported 
H1c Supplier perceived relationship value is positively associated with its intentions for relationship enhancement. supported 
H1d Supplier switching costs are positively associated with its intentions for relationship enhancement, albeit not as strongly as supplier perceived relationship value. partly supported 
H1e Buyer switching costs are less related with its intentions for relationship enhancement than supplier switching costs with supplier relationship enhancement. not supported  
 
Relational tolerance 
 H2a Buyer perceived relationship value is positively associated with its relational tolerance. not supported  
H2b Buyer switching costs are more positively associated with relational tolerance than is buyer perceived relationship value. supported 
H2c Supplier perceived relationship value is positively associated with its relational tolerance. supported 
H2d Supplier switching costs are positively associated with its relational tolerance. supported 
H2e 
Supplier perceived relationship value has a greater impact on supplier relational tolerance than 
buyer perceived relationship value on buyer relational tolerance; whereas supplier switching 
costs have a lesser impact on supplier relational tolerance than buyer switching costs on buyer 
relational tolerance. supported 
 
Search for alternatives 
 H3a Buyer perceived relationship value is negatively associated with its tendency to search for alternatives. supported 
H3b Buyer perceived relationship value is more strongly (negatively) associated with its tendency to search for alternatives than are buyer switching costs. supported 
H3c Supplier perceived relationship value is negatively associated with its tendency to search for alternatives. supported 
H3d Supplier switching costs are positively associated with its tendency to search for alternatives. supported 
 
Switch intention 
 H4a Buyer perceived relationship value is negatively associated with its switch intentions. supported 
H4b Buyer switching costs are negatively associated with its switch intention, albeit not as strongly as buyer perceived relationship value. supported 
H4c Supplier perceived relationship value has a mild negative association with its switch intention. supported 
H4d Supplier switching costs have a mild negative association with its switch intention. supported 
H4e 
Buyer perceived relationship value and buyer switching costs exert a greater negative 
influence on buyer switch intention than do supplier perceived relationship value and supplier 
switching costs on supplier switch intention. partly supported 
 
